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THESE three books about recent diplomatic history are part of the great public
debate which will help to settle the immediate controversies of our foreign
policy. Each attempts to draw lessons for the future from what it treats as the
mistakes, and successes, of tl!e last thirty years of our behavior in the inter-
national community. Each is primarily concerned with certain of the large
decisions which the government of the United States will have to make:
whether to help build, and then join, a new League of Nations; whether to
maintain our wartime alliances and associations; and how to treat Germany,
Japan and our other enemies. These are the first questions of our times. Their
resolution will fix the course of our foreign policy for a generation, and estab-
lish the framework within which we can pursue domestic social, political and
economic goals. How they are met will determine the fate of the Republic.
In that sense these are desperately popular books, and it may not be alto-
gather inappropriate for them to be reviewed by a lay reader, rather than a
professional historian.
One striking quality of our thinking about the problems of war and peace
marks all three of these books. To an extraordinary extent, the isstes have
been framed for us by the experience of the last war. In a sense, we have
been reliving the years between 1914 and 1921, Allies and Germans alike.
For some purposes, this has been a useful psychological fact. Fortified with
the thought of history repeating itself, the British did not despair in 1940;
nor did the Germans ever quite escape an uneasy sense of their doom. Even
in the middle of 1942, we never seriously contemplated the possibility of
losing the war. Now, facing the peace, we find that the debate of Wilson and
Lodge, of President Taft and the elder La Follette, is still going on. We are
greatly concerned, perhaps too greatly concerned, with Wilson's tactics and
Wilson's points-his failure to consult the Senate in advance, his offer of a
military alliance to France, the constitutional problem he provoked about the
President's power to use the armed forces, whether the new League should
or should not be part of the Peace Treaty, and so on.
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Wilson was a very great prophet, but a poor negotiator and political leader.
Wilson's eloquence, his religious ardor, his legend, and above all his forceful
and misleading formulation of the issues, are proving on the whole to be a
handicap to serious thinking about the problems of our foreign policy. Wilson
should be taken as the heroic symbol of a basic axiom of our foreign policy,
not the spokesman of a detailed program. The doctrine for which he stands,
broadly speaking, in the public mind todav,--and on this point our people are
now disposed to agree that he was right-is the doctrine that in the modem
world peace is indivisible, and that the United States has a continuing and
responsible national interest in preserving it. This Doctrine should be con-
sidered with the Monroe Doctrine as an enduring cornerstone of our foreign
policy, and it might well become known, by analogy, as the Wilson Doctrine.
Beyond that broad proposition, however, it is unnecessary and even danger-
ous to follow Wilson too closely. Times, forces, and problems have changed.
And even for his own times Wilson was not by any means a leader without
blemish.
The incubus of Wilsonism is the main subject matter of these three books.
Mr. Welles' important tract is in part a memoir of his experience as Under-
Secretary of State, in part a program for the development of a continuous and
consistent American foreign policy. Written with color and passion, it
strongly presents the case for a Wilsonian approach to the problems of peace.
It digresses at some points, notably in its extended treatment of Pan-American
problems, and it pays off some personal and professional scores, with com-
pound interest. But in the main it is an essay on the problems of Versailles,
reviewed and brought up to date in the light of our subsequent experience.
Starting with a balanced and concise analysis of the issues before the 1919
peacemakers, it considers the diplomacy of the period between wars, reports
on Mr. Welles' 1940 mission to Europe, and, in a useful last chapter, lists
the main elements and objectives of an enduring American foreign policy.
Mr. Welles urges an immediate beginning on the task of organizing a new
League, and the creation of our ultimate security arrangements through it.
This association, however, must not "come suddenly into being as a completed
and detailed international charter." It must be rather a gradual growth, based on
experience, and sustained in its earlier period of life by the vigorous continuance
in peacetime of our present alliance for carrying on the war.'
Unlike many commentators on the problem of our security, Mr. Welles
does not evade the essential condition precedent to the success of a new League--
the question of how German territory shall be politically organized. He dis-
misses the casual and superficial plan of restoring the status quo ante 1939.
He strongly supports the policy of undoing the German union of 1871, and
of partitioning Germany into separate states. Through these states the
German people could quickly resume a profitable participation in the political
1. VE.=s, THE TIME FoR DEcisio (1944) 370.
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and economic life of Europe, without constituting a military threat to any-
body. This approach to the German problem offers the United States a
maximum chance for its security during the next fifty years.2 In this and
other important particulars-notably on the maintenance of international
staff arrangements-Mr. Welles differs from Wilson, but the conception of
policy he advocates is Wilsonian in its broadest and best sense.
Mr. Lippmann, the most useful and responsible of our war-time journal-
ists, has written a cogent pamphlet which in many ways complements Mr.
Welles' book. In broad strokes, and with admirable balance and perspective,
Mr. Lippmann sets out the political and strategic factors which twice in this
century have led us to fight for the system of power on which our safety
as a nation depends. From this analysis, he develops a program through which
our foreign policy might well hope to consolidate and secure the peace-a
program of close association with Britain, France and the other nations of
the West, in an "Atlantic Community" which would remain closely linked,
both through direct coalition and through a new League of Nations, with
like regional communities centering in the Soviet Union, China, and ultimately
in the Moslem world. The new League would not have primary responsibility
for keeping the peace. Such a view of the League's functions "will fix the
responsibility where alone it can be discharged-upon the governments of
the great powers and their neighbors with whom they are allied. There will
be no pretense, and no escape by means of the pretense, that the responsibility
for preventing war is anywhere else than where it really is: in the great mili-
tary states themselves." 3 Mr. Lippmann professes to be anti-Wilsonian in
outlook, and his prescription of what should be done to keep the peace pur-
ports to differ profoundly, in procedure at least, from the course of action
proposed by Mr. Welles. When compared in detail, however, the differences
seem illusory. The actual programs of the two men are not tar apart.
Professor Bailey has written a clear, if academic, analysis of what Wilson
did at Paris, with a view to instructing us as to Wilson's errors, and those of
other men. It is a convenient review of what happened, and an interesting
case study in why American youth has been so badly educated on the basic
problems of American security. Careful and workmanlike in detail, the book
never considers, nor even presents, the fundamental system of ideas which
dominates it, and gives it shape. These ideas emerge in asides, and in the
2. It is a paradox that Mr. Lippmann's book, so clear in its perception of the power
foundations of political order, is weak in its prescription for Germany. His program
would leave a vengeful, strong Germany a good fighting chance to divide the Russians
from Britain, France and the United States, and permit Germans again to dream of
achieving the condition of 1939-Russian neutrality during a German war against the west.
One may assume that even German militarism has learned that war in the East cannot pay.
See also HOW To END THi GERMAN MENACE, A POLITICAL PROPOSAL, BY FIVE HOLLANDMS
(1944).
3. LrPPMANN, U. S. Wa Ants (1944) 168-169.
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interstices of the chapters. Together, the asides constitute the most dangerous
of all the Vilson legends: the Ray Stannard Baker thesis, recently revived
by Mr. NVilliam Bullitt and others, that Wilson was forced by "power poli-
tics" in Paris to compromise with his principles, with the result that the
Treaty became an unjust instrument for oppressing Germany, and therefore
"caused" the present war. If Professor Bailey devoted one quarter of the
attention to the fallacies of this thesis that he gives, for example, to the con-
troversies at Versailles over Fiume or Shantung, his book would have been a
great deal more intelligible, and useful.
In essence, all three books grapple with this same general issue, which is
perhaps the worst single aspect of our Wilsonian legacy. The issue is vari-
ously defined as a supposed choice between "power politics" and "idealism,"
between "domination of the Big Four" and "equality for small nations," be-
tween American virtue and European vice. The words and ideas get almost
hopelessly enmeshed with American insularity, smugness and xenophobia.
They become the crocodile tears of our isolationists, who urged us to ignore
the fall of France, and now weep over the fate of Estonia. They provide one
of the last arguments of the isolationists, in the form of the doctrine that we
should be too proud, as we are too pure, to become entangled in the dirty
power politics of the world-a curious and extraordinary idea to prevail among
Americans, whose domestic politics have always been human, not to say earthy,
in their practical compromises and adjustments. It is an extraordinary idea
in another sense as well. The course of world politics has always involved
the United States in general world wars, and presumably always wil. It is
hard to understand how we can be expected to look after our vital national
interest in controlling this phenomenon by ignoring the political events which
govern it.
However, the issue is planted deep in the public mind. Mr. Welles and
Mr. Lippmann, as well as Professor Bailey, have hard words about "power
politics" scattered through their books. The phrase is hard to define, because
the supposed choice between power and other kinds of politics doesn't exist.
Vhat alternative basis is there for political action, short of natural or canonical
law? How can the rules, customs and legal norms which govern the use of
power conceal the fact that power is the final constituent- of social organiza-
tion, and that the main preoccupation of law, municipal and international, is
to control the exercise of authority in ways which fulfill accepted social and
ethical purposes? The uses of power are governed in each caie by the whole
content of the culture in which men assert their authority. However much the
exercise of power is circumscribed by history, courts, elections, or other
mechanisms of control, there is no evading the fact it is power we are talking
about, and power which has the last word. Nothing can alter the fact that
there are large and small states, states with and without military power. Power
is exercised differently by different countries, according to their cultural habits,
just as the ultimate police power within a state is differently used in Switzer-
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land, say, and Roumania, in Georgia and in Vermont. Canada, the small
neighbor of a great power, faces different military risks than Belgium. The
imaginary alternative between power and another basis for political action
is false, and the prevalence of the idea conceals and confuses real issues.
Nonetheless, the idea does exist and must be dealt with. It makes two
main appearances in the books under review: one in considering what was
done at Versailles, the other in discussing how a new League should be or-
ganized at a new Versailles.
What people generally mean when they talk about "power politics" at Ver-
sailles in 1919 is quite specific, and generally speaking quite mistaken. The
phrase is used broadly to characterize the view that Wilson's error at
Versailles was his undue concession to European "pqwer politics," which
chiefly means European fear of renewed German aggression. It assumes that
the enduring weakness of Versailles was the abstract injustice of the settle-
ment with Germany, in violating the principle of self-determination, rather
than our failure to build on, enforce and modify the settlement in the light
of events. As Mr. Lippmann points out, it is a great mystery why Americans
feel so deeply about self-determination in Europe, since we fought a bloody
war, and imposed a harsh and punitive peace after it, to stamp out the doc-
trine among ourselves. Yet such a view of the Versailles conference is widely
held in this country. It accepts the main argument of twenty years of German
propaganda, and assumes that the "injustices" of Versailles were an important
factor in Hitler's rise to power. It leads to the conclusion that the way to
prevent another Hitler from coming along is for us once more to fight bit-
terly with our Allies at the peace conference, as Germany's advocate, to obtain
a soft peace. Mr. Welles, though he repudiates this tendency at one point,
4
is not altogether free of the conviction that the chief sinners at Versailles
were British and French, and that we must be on guard~ against their suc-
cessors. Professor Bailey, of course, supports this doctrine with uncritical
faith.
It is one of the greatest merits of Mr. Lippmann's book that he tackles
the myth head on. Looking back, it seems perfectly plain that what turned
out to be the disastrous difficulties of Versailles were not Wilson's conces-
sions to Clemencedu, but Clemenceau's concessions to Wilson. The size of
the reparations bill, which Professor Bailey calls the greatest of Wilson's
errors, proved to be a nuisance, and caused bitter hard feeling among the
Allies, since Wilson and his successors refused to link the war debts' ques-
tion to that of reparations. But Germany received four times as much in
loans as she ever paid in reparations-and then defaulted on the loans. In
any event, reparations were abolished for good in 1930, three years before
Hitler came to power. They can hardly count as a substantial cause of Hitler-
ism and the war, except in helping to weaken the coalition which might have
prevented war.
4. W=W.s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11, 17.
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No, the 1919 decisions which turned out to be catastrophic were quite
different: our failure to support some form of international military staff
organization; our failure to ratify the treaty of alliance with France, with
which Wilson horn-swoggled Clemenceau out of a Rhenish republic; our
resistance to all serious proposals for partitioning Germany, or even en-
couraging German separatism in Bavaria and elsewhere. Nothing is more
striking in the literature about the peace than reiterated British and American
complaints about the tiresome and long-winded French delegates. Poor
Frenchmen l They went on and on, with their orderly speeches and their
eloquent perorations, because they knev they were right, and knew that they
were not persuading their Allies. They thought we would see the point if ex-
posed to enough logic., Fortunately or unfortunately, logic is not the life of
our foreign policy. Bonsal's rueful note is the best comment on the phenome-
non: ... "whenever the French plan of putting force behind the League was
projected into the discussions it was warmly, if but briefly, supported by
Dmowski (Poland), Vesnitch (Serbia), Kramfir (Czechoslovakia), and Hy-
mans (Belgium) .... When the meager sop of consolation (Article IX)
was handed out Dmowski said sadly: 'I had hoped that our distinguished
and most welcome visitors from across the seas, broad as well as narrow,
would carefully weigh the unanimous opinion of those unfortunate peoples
who dwell so near the cave where the wolf pack lowers." Bonsal appends this
footnote: "It is sad to admit that these five countries were the first to suffer
from the failure of the conference to take the precautionary measures which
they so repeatedly advocated." r
Beyond the detailed issues of the 1919 Peace Conference, however, there
is a general proposition, put by Professor Bailey in this form: "There are
two ways of dealing with a fallen foe. The one is to make a peace so generous
that he may forgive and forget. Whether Germany would have responded
favorably to such treatment is still a matter of speculation, but there was a
possibility that it might have worked. The second method is to impose a
victor's peace, with the purpose of keeping the conqueror's heel on the enemy's
neck as long as physically possible. This method is certain to breed aonther
war." 6 Apart from its extraordinary suggestion that we owed Germany an
apology for winning the last war, the notion is so unhistorical, so contrary to
common sense, and so plausible as to deserve special comment. The early
annexations of Prussia, including those ratified in the victor's peace of 1871,
did not give rise to wars of revenge. The French in 1914 mourned Alsace
and Lorraine, but hadn't the faintest idea of risking war with the German
army to retake them. So do the Danes regret Schleswig-Holstein, and so did
the France of the Bourbon restoration look back nostalgically at Belgium.
The settlement of 1865 in the United States was harsh and was resented, but
it has prevented a renewal of civil war, and in all probability has buried the
5. BoxsAr., UNxFn'isHE_ Busn-,ss (1944) 188 and n. 9.
6. BA=LEY, XVooDmOW WVISON AND THE LoSr PFcA (1944) 312-313.
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secession issue in the United States forever. This was not a foreordained
result, for secessionism and self-determination had flourished in New England
and elsewhere in many forms before 1865. We might well have taken the
uneasy and unstable course, now accepted by the British, of trying to build a
constitution on the principle of voluntary association. The harsh peace of
1865 has worked, as have other harsh as well as mild peace arrangements,
when circumstances of power and interest favored peace. The resentment
of the Germans against Versailles was one of the latent forces in German
life which Hitler exploited, when the depression and the social disorganization
of Germany after 1929 gave him his opportunity. That resentment, however,
had very little to do with the merits or demerits of the Treaty itself. It was
the consequence of defeat, which can be studied in our South, among the
Boers of South Africa, the Hungarians, and many other peoples. The same
spirit will exist in Germany for several generations after this war, whether
the new peace be mild or harsh. Defeat is a traumatic experience with painful
consequences, especially for Germans.
The second area in which we are much confused with talk of power politics
is that of plans for the organization of a new League. How can we reconcile
the principle of the sovereign equality of nations with the fact that states are
not equal in power, and that great wars are the affair of great powers, not
little ones? Shall we use the rule of unanimity in large decisions, or a simple
majority, or the rule of unanimity among the great powers alone? Shall the
keeping of the peace be a function of the new League, or of the great Powers
through a committee of the League, or of the great Powers apart from the
League? Certainly the rule of unanimity was one of the profound weaknesses
of the old League, paralyzing its capacity to act. Yet, just as certainly there
seems to be something undemocratic or even dictatorial about an arrangement
which doesn't give each sovereign nation a voice, and a vote, in the important
affairs of community life.
It is on this series of issues that Mr. Welles and Mr. Lippmann seem to
be furthest apart, and actually are closest together. Both men agree that re-
gional systems exist, and should be accepted in some form within the frame-
work of a general system of security. Regional systems will permit the
solution of most conflicts by the neighbors, large and small, directly concerned.
Mr. Welles says that the new League must have responsibiliy for keeping the
peace. Mr. Lippmann says it should be concerned in the first instance with
the important order of international problems not directly concerned with
maintaining the peace-with colonial problems, the advance of science, tech-
nology, labor standards, and the like. In his view, keeping the peace is for
some time-perhaps a generation-the primary responsibility of the great
powers. But Mr. Welles concedes that "the four major powers primarily
responsible for winning the war and for preventing renewed outbreaks after
the armistice must necessarily assume the basic responsibility for making and
[Vol. 53
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carrying out all military decisions." - He proposes that they should create a
Provisional United Nations Executive Council of eleven, which could act
only on a two-thirds vote, including the votes of all four great powers. This
council would be a first step towards reconciling two basic problems-the
need of the great powers for freedom of military action, and the need for
giving full representation and protection to the smaller powers. Mr. Lipp-
mann says what Mr. Welles is too much a Wilsonian to emphasize, although
in effect he admits it: that for some time, perhaps a long time to come, keeping
the peace, like fighting the war, will be the job primarily of the great military
powers. Only the diplomacy and good sense of the great powers can prevent
Germany or Japan, or a new aggressor, from gaining military freedom by
playing the Allies against each other. "The organized power which wins the
war must be used to win the peace. It can bring to an end the frightful wars
of our age. If it cannot, then nothing can, certainly not some pale, thin,
abstract, generalized blueprint of a mechanism." 8 The new League, in Mr.
Lippmann's view, should build its strength and influence as an instrument of
consultation and conciliation, first on the essentially non-political issues, later
as its powers may grow with success. "We have to reverse the Wilsonian pat-
term of collective security. We cannot build a universal society from the top
downwards. We must build up to it from the existing national states and
historic communities. That, I think, is what we must learn from the great
experiment at Geneva and from its failure. We have, I am convinced, to learn
it thoroughly. For we cannot afford to fail again." o
Mr. Welles' view is not substantially different:
"I have long felt that a major reason for the failure of the League
was the fact that the Covenant came suddenly into being as a com-
pleted and detailed international charter. It was not a carrying-over
into the time of peace of the alliance which had been created during
the war. It did not grow gradually as a result of actual experience.
Furthermore, because the Covenant came full-grown into being, peo-
ples everywhere were apt to persuade themselves that a final and
real peace already existed. It was impossible for their governments
to arouse them to the truth that the Covenant was but paper, and
would remain so unless each of the major powers was willing to use,
if necessary, sufficient armed strength to carry out the provisions
both of the Covenant and of the peace treat , itself, especially during
the first turbulent postwar years.
"After this war a wholly different approach seems indispensable.
It is essential that, before the war ends, the United Nations agree
to a transition period to follow the surrender of their enemies. Its
length would be fixed later by common agreement and would depend
on their progress in laying the foundations for a world of peace.
7 WELLES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 372.
8. LiPp MxN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 164-165.
9. Ibid. at 195.
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During this transition period the United Nations would have a chance
to complete the first and most urgent military steps required; to cor-
rect the cardinal territorial errors of the past; to carry out such
transfers of populations as may be necessary; to conclude the more
immediate programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction; and to
pave the way for their ultimate assumption of international trustee-
ship ov-r such dependent peoples as are not yet ready to enjoy the
rights of self-government. During this period, as the hatreds and
bitternesse§ engendered by the war years gradually burn themselves
out, the United Nations can, little by little, determine the specific
machinery needed for a permanent and effective international organ-
ization." 10
Only by facing these facts can we progress towards a system of security in
which the luxuries of demobilization, trade, and social progress can be pur-
sued. Slogans about "power politics" and "dictatorship of the great powers"
only divert attention from the fact that there are great powers, which must
meet their responsibility for peace by using their power. Power must be
used wisely, in concert, and after consultation with all concerned; but it must
be used, or the peace will turn into an uneasy armistice. If our close associa-
tion with the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, France and Chinai is
maintained after the war, as an enduring and living reality, spreading from
the military realm to the realms of commerce, cultural interchange, and human
association, then the constitutional problems of League-making will be easy
matters of draftsmanship and detail. It will not be easy to maintain the
alliance. As in 1919, strong forces are at work, playing on irrational and
ideological prejudices, to' divide the Allies. It will take energy, imagination
and statesmanship of a high order to preserve the concert of the Powers.
That concert can be preserved, for there are no conflicts of actual interest
among the Allies which cannot be peacefully harmonized. All have a common
stake in the restoration and maintenance of peace, and in the establishment
of effective peaceful methods for reconciling and settling international dis-
putes. In reorganizing the system of world power after the collapse of Ger-
many, ticklish political issues will arise, as was the case after the collapse
and partitioning of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires earlier in this
century. It will necessarily be difficult to resolve these and the other basic
political and economic 'problems of the world community through the pro-
cedure of agreed action. Without that procedure, however, solution would
be impossible. Unless a real coalition of the great powers is maintained, as
the nucleus of a larger association of nations, League-making will be an empty
and sterile exercise, as it was in 1919, and there will be no peace.
EUGENE V. Rosrow t
10. WVELiEs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 370-371.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
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